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Abstract

J groups of 48 female high school students were presented
with varying amounts of input stimuli (6, 8, or 10 nouns) in an
intentional concept-formation task, and were later tested for
recall of incidental stimuli and identification of incidental
concepts.

Subjects within each group were divided into Jrds for

information-processing ability from Schroder's Paragraph Completion Test, for authoritarianism from the California F Scale, and
for intelligence from the SRA High School Placement Test.

Anal-

ysis on each dependent variable included: (a) 3 two-way analyses
of variance for information and conceptual level, or authoritarianism, or intelligence, (b) 2 analyses of covariance
between input and cognitive complexity or authoritarianism with
intelligence as covariate, and (c) 2 analyses of covariance for
input and authoritarianism or intelligence with complexity as
covariate.

Major results weres (a) no significant effects for

integrative complexity, (b) low authoritarian persons performed
better than other persons on the incidental task, with no differences on the intentional task, (c) intelligence had an effect on
both types of learning, (d) a curvilinear relationship exists
between quantity of relevant information and performance on the
intentional task, and (e) added irrelevant material decreased
incidental concept formation.

The validity of Schroder's test

was questioned; the suggestions that cognitive style affects
processing of incidental stimuli, and that excessive input loads
may cause a "jamming" of information systems were proposed.

1
,_

Intentional and Incidental Concept Formation as
a Function of Conceptual Structure,
Information, Intelligence, and
Authoritarianism

David J. Marx
Loyola University, Chicago
The phenomenon of incidental learning involves the basic
principles of selective discrimination and the immediate
storage of environmental information.

Experimental explora-

tion in this area has concentrated mainly on individual
capabilities and response dispositions while ignoring the
principles of response integration and associative strength.
Specifically, conditions limiting an individual's response in
a learning situation and the analysis of memory without the
mobilization of instrumental acts have received widespread
attention.

Extensive explanations employ the concepts of

differential cue-producing responses (Postman, 1964) and the
omission of appropriate representational responses during
stimulus presentation (Deese, 1964).
The distinction between intentional and incidental
learntng lacks precise formulation due to the vagueness of
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3.
the operational definition for incidental learning.

Initially,

early investigators (Postrean & Senders, 1946; Underwood &
Schulz, 1960) explained differences on the basis of set or
an apparent state of subject preparedness.

However, McGuigan

(1958) discovered that "incidental" subjects often maintained
an awareness of irrelevant cues through self-instructions or
from characteristics of the presented material (McGeoch &
Irion, 1952),

In addition, Altra (1960) openly questioned

the existence of "learning without awareness".

As a result,

operational procedures sustained revisions with Postman (1964)
eventually concluding that incidental learning occurs by means
of instructional stimuli only.

Consequently, intentional

learning is that type of learning occurring when subjects are
explicitly instructed to note or memorize relevant stimuli.
In contrast, incidental learning is operationally defined as
that learning which occurs without specific designations to
learn predetermined material.
A thorough analysis of experimental evidence disclosed
that several methodological difficulties exist in this area
of investigation.

Despite these complications, current research

attempts to formulate appropriate explanatory concepts and
to discover the functional properties of relevant variables.
With regard to the former purpose, Tresselt and Mayzner (1960)
and Mechanic (1962) supported Postman's hypothesis that
incidental learning increases with the number of differential
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responses evoked by the stimulus.

In the same realm, Mechanic

(1962) proposed that performance of the intentional task interferes with incidental learning because of task competition;
and Miller and Lakso (1964) and Wray (1967) suggested that
attention on material affects incidental learning with further
clarification by Gutjahr (1958) that retention is not dependent
upon intention to learn but upon sensory attention.

Further-

more, Eagle and Leiter (1964) stated that intention to learn
was only significant in that it generated adequate learning
operations; and Quartermain and Scott (1960) concluded that
relevance of material to the achievement of specified goals
determines the type of stimuli incidentally learned.
Silverstein (1964) discovered that associations emitted by
intentional subjects were less conventional than those of
incidental participants, while Dornbush and Winnick (1967) found
that intentional learners actually employ more representational
responses.

In addition, Postman and Phillips (1954), Goldstein

and Solomon (1955), Postman and Adams (1960), and Tatz (1960)
have suggested that intentional and incidental learning are
mediated by identical symbolic processes.

Schneider and Kintz

(1967) defined this process more precisely as one involving instruction stimuli, an orienting task, and attentiono

In con-

trast, Rosenberg (1962) disconfirmed the hypothesis that
incidental learning occurs through generalization of instructional stimuli or set (Dey, 1965);. while Nayzner and Tresselt
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(1962) demonstrated the effectiveness of high associative
strength and small S-R distance upon recall in "incidental"
tasks.
Mechanic (1962) and Mechanic and D'Andrea (1966) disclosed
that incidental learning increased as a function of the
hypothesized number of pronounced replies demanded by the orienting task; and Mechanic and Mechanic (1967) proposed
equivalence between incidental and intentional learning when
the task elicited pronouncing responses.

Mechanic also

described incidental learning as a more "selective" process in
that such learners respond to fewer stimuli.

Burnstein (1960)

likewise discussed both types of learning as a function of
selection processeso
Finally, Restle and Emmerich (1966) stated that shortterm memory was the product of active recoding and Scandura and
Roughead (1966) revealed that the quantity of recalled nouns was
dependent upon recoding cues.

Sommers (1967) supported the

limited capacity hypothesis (Murdock, 1965) for both conditions
of learning.

This position states that individuals possess a

limited capacity for immediate recall of information learned in
a specified time periodo

This result may occur due to limi-

tations placed on the rate of processing information.
Another aim of recent research is to examine the functional
properties of various factors, particularly subject variables,
upon incidental learning.

Amster (1966) concluded that

6.
older children perform better than younger children and that
irrelevant cues inhibit learning.

Contrary to past experiment-

ation, Greenwald and Sakumura (1967) disclosed that an
individual's attitude does not affect the learning of propagandistic information in an incidental nor an intentional learning
situation.

Cohen (1966) noted that incidental learning was

related to sex difference and to certain personality traits;
while Paradowski (1967) established that curiosity significantly
increased both types of learning.
Plenderleith and Postman (1956) indicated that (1) the
ability of the individual to attend to multiple phases of the
information input and (2) the availability of differential
responses to presented stimuli possess a direct relationship to
success in incidental learning.

Wide intersubject variations in

this learning condition exist since several individuals fail
to employ their differentiating and integrating abilities upon
input material.

Hence only readily available differential

responses are often emitted (McLaughlin, 1965) with personal
response habits mainly designating the pattern of selectivity
(Postman, Adams, & Phillips, 1955).

Mechanic (1962) and

Laughlin (1967) revealed no significant relationship between
intelligence and amount of incidental learning.

Silverman and

Blitz (1956) confirmed the postulation that increased.motivation
decreases incidental learning with Easterbrook (1959) explaining
these·results on the basis of restricted cue utilization.

Finally, Laughlin (1967) indicated that creativity and
incidental learning involve the identical process consisting
of the formation, retention, and utilization of remote
associations.

Laughlin, Doherty, and Dunn (1968) replicated

these findings with the additional discovery that both types
of learning increased as a function of intelligence with high
school students as subjects.

Consequently, the

pur~ose

of the

present report was to analyze the role of intelligence and
other subject and task characteristics in intentional and
incidental learning.

Specifically, the effects of the cognitive

structure of the individual and his level of authoritarianism
with varying amounts of input load upon an intentional and
incidental concept formation task were examined.
According to the theoretical exposition posited by
Schroder, Driver, and Streufert (1967), individuals process
information through divergent systems under different situations
and each person employs individualistic processing approaches
under identical conditions.

These differences exist since each

person possesses a different conceptual structure, a system
of mediating links denoting the method employed in the acquisition, storage, processing, and transmission of information.
These authors are not interested in the content of material, but
with the organization of input data.

Consequently, the

integrative complexity of the conceptual structure refers to the
number of unique dimensions along ,which input information is
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differentiated and the number and interrelatedness of combinatory schemata employed in the organization of environmental and
self-generated information.
Individuals maintaining a low integrative index employ
few dimensions of information and demonstrate a relatively
static hierarchical form of integration among few or fixed
schemata or rules.

In addition, a concrete structure demands

comparative certainty, possesses a determinate character, and
eliminates conflicts of choice.

All rules of integration are

subject to precise designations and all elements of ambiguity
are immediately eliminated.

Low conceptual-level individuals

are less adaptable to environmental needs and exhibit the
tendency to refer a stimulus to the same category once a
decision has been formulated (Schroder et al., 196?).

These

persons also demonstrate low comprehension capabilities (Brown,

1965), an omission of information for less critical elements
of the environment (Suedfeld & Streufert, 1966), and a lack of
search for novel information (Suedfeld & Streufert, 1966) or
for information in general with imposed explicit costs (Stager

& Kennedy, 1965).

Lastly, low conceptual level members

manifest less activity in their "searching

beh~vior"

(Karlins

& Lamm, 1967) and a tendency to simplify and structure their
environment (Stager, 196?).
In contrast, highly complex individuals effectively adapt
to complex, variable environments; delineate between several

systematically related alternatives; and develop through
current conditions superordinate schemata for information
organization {Schrode2·

&

Harvey, 1963) •

Comprehension and the

ability to cope with diversity and conflict is high together
with the desire for assimilating additional information
{Schroder et al., 1967).

Tolerance for ambiguity and uncer-

tainty with minimum attempts at reduction {Sieber & Lanzetta,

1964) and extensive evaluation and integration of discrepant
information characterize abstract individuals.

In the same

realm, high conceptual structures permit multiple discriminations of input along several dimensions and. the incorporation
of various perspectives when processing discrepant units of
inforro~tion

{Karlins & Lamm, 196?).

Research has demonstrated that conceptually complex
subjects are more information oriented; and therefore, process
more information in any situation {Schroder, Driver, &
Streufert, 1965).

Streufert and Schroder {1965) substantiated

Schroder and his associates' postulated inverted U curve for the
handling of information {Schroder et al., 1967) with additional
clarification by Streufert and Driver {1965) and Streufert and
Schroder (1965) that different cognitive structures display
varying levels of this basic function,

Streufert, Suedfeld,

and Driver (1965) showed that increased information loads did
not significantly affect searching behavior; and Suedfeld and
Hagen (1966) found. that highly integrative individuals process
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complex information more effectively than low-level individuals.
Employing these concepts, our initial predictions were that
conceptually complex subjects would perform better on the
incidental concept formation task than low-complex subjects;
and that since both levels of complexity display similar
abilities in processing relevant cues, no significant differences should occur in the amount of intentional learning.
Ignoring the environmental properties of information
diversity and rate of information change, experimentation has
demonstrated that degree of information load rates as a prime
factor in the prediction of task performance.

This is

exemplified by the fact that overly simple levels of input fail
to present sufficient units of information for integration,
while excessive loads inhibit such activity.

In the area of

concept identification, Denny and Gamlin (1965) disclosed that
concept-formation proficiency is highly dependent upon input
factors while other researchers (Garner, 1962) have indicated
that the form and the amount of redundant information significantly affect an individual's level of performance.
The prominence of stimulus redundancy was originally
established in the area of communication by Newman and Gerstman

(1952) and Chapanis (1954).

Research by Rappaport (1957)

illustrated that relevant stimulus redundancy even facilitated
the discrimination of visual forms with simultaneous background
noise; and Bourne and Haygood (1961) discoverAd the same effect

11 •
.'ant redundancy in a concept-formation task eliminating
--:ents of irrelevant information.
'~onsion

This conclusion under-

when Haygood and Bourne (1964) replicated these

1.n the presence of irrelevant information; and further
:~d

that increasing amounts of irrelevant information

; degraded performance.
~.s

latter hypothesis has received several confirmations

, Bourne, & Brown, 1955; Bourne, 1957; Bourne & Pendleton,
,)ele & Archer, 1967) and fUrther clarifications •
.lla and Archer {1962) noted that problem difficulty
· xl linearly as irrelevant dimensions increased and there~t

the quantity of errors and time to achieve criterion

imilarily increase {Rasmussen & Archer, 1961).

Byers

tdson (1968) stated that the addition of irrelevant inon increased complexity but produced only nonsign1f1cant
'.~nee

decrements.

~1evant

Trabasso (1963) predicted that removal

cues would assist learning and Wolfgang {1967)

0d the assumption that learning rate decreases with

0d quantities of irrelevant input except when partners
·mi tted free interaction.

Kirloskar and Parameswaran

indicated that irrelevant factors may have differential
: on concept formation; and Haygood and Stevenson (1967)
·rated that the usual rate of linear decrement is greater
; complexity increases.

Finally, Simon and Jackson {1968)

1ed the o'bservation response with an obser-v-ation stimulus
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and found that the relevant observation stimulus aided performance, while irrelevant material retarded learning.
Bourne and Haygood (1959) explained these findings by
noting that learning rate depends on the quantity of both
relevant and irrelevant information.

Redundant relevant

material assists concept identification by providing the individual access to an increased supply of cues to identify
stimuli correctly.

In contrast, redundant irrelevant infor-

mation increases the saliency of irrelevant cues and consequently retards individual attainments.

Walker and Bourne

(1961) clarified the two uses of the concept "redundancy" by
emphasizing that one demands that the subject employ additional
information in the classification of material, while the other
permits the participant to use any one of several relevant
dimensions to categorize stimuli.
By incorporating this latter usage with the comment by
Winnick and Wasserman (1959) that variation in irrelevant
material affects incidental learning and through extension of
conclusions concerning stimulus dimensions to the actual amount
of exemplars of a concept, the predictions for this report were
formulatede

Since instructions focused the subject's attention

on the intentional task, examples of this concept were considered as relevant information and all other st:1.muli as irrelevant material.

Consequently, the hypothesis was that as the

list of relevcnt intenti0nal nouns increased, performance would

1.3.
increase.

In contrast, the prediction for incidental learning

was a linear decrement in performance for the same lists since
in the incidental concept-formation task, all intentional
concept words would be processed as irrelevant information.
Regarding the third variable, authoritarianism has been
explained in terms of cognitive style.

Adorno and his asso-

ciates (1950) postulated that high authoritarianism may be
characterized by rigidity in thinking.

This suggests that

representative individuals will function less effectively when
certain cognitive shifts are required, when novel cognitive
material is displayed, and when ambiguity exists in the task
situation (Brown, 1965).

In the initial position, Rokeach

(1948) found a positive relationship between authoritarianism
and inability to shift from an established "set" in solving
a numerical problem.

Brown (195.3) managed to repeat these

results for ego-involved subjects; and Jackson, Messick, and
Solley (1957) discovered an identical association; however, they
explained their results as reflecting acquiescence both in the
F scores and the measures of rigidity.
Research analyzing the relationship between authoritarianism and tolerance of ambiguity has not been conclusive
(Davids, 1956; Kenny and Ginsberg, 1958); however, Milton's

(1957) experiment clearly differentiated between the two
entities of "intolerance of ambiguity" and "rigidity" in a
novel ·perceptual task.

White and Harvey ( 1965) at tempted to
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demonstrate that individuals scoring high on the F Scale are
generally more concrete; and consequently, less tolerant of uncertainty and ambiguity.

Harvey (196J) summarized his research

on authoritarianism (Harvey & Rutherford, 1958; Harvey &
Beverly, 1961; Harvey, 1962) and generally concluded that high
authoritative people form concepts of novel stimuli more quickly
in comparison to low authoritative persons, that "highs" ward
off changes in their

fo~mulated

concepts, and demonstrate less

discrimination on concepts of central significance to the
individual.
In recent experimentation, several investigators have noted
that generally individuals scoring high on the California F
Scale demonstrate characteristics of a simple cognitive
structure.

Likewise, subjects rating low on the Authoritar-

ianism Scale display rather complex information-processing
behavior.

However, as indicated by Schroder and his associates

(1967), this relationship has not been conclusively explicated;
and therefore, one of the goals of this project was to reanalyze
the correspondence between these two entities.

Similarly, the

hypothesis was that low authoritative individuals would perform
better on the incidental-learning task than persons ranlcing high
on the Authoritarianism Scale and that no differences would
occur on the intentional concept-formation task.
Finally, the investigators predicted that performance on
incidental co!lcept formacion would not be-related to degrees
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of intelligence but that differences would be significant with
analysis of covariance employing level of cognitive complexity
as the covariate.

No interactions between authoritarianism and

information load were hypothesized.

However, predictions for

an interaction between degree of cognitive structure and
information input were formulated.

Method
Subjects.

The subjects were 144 female seniors from

Aquinas High School, a non-coeducational institution.

Three

groups of 48 participants were randomly composed and were
randomly assigned to one of three experimental treatments.
Regular homeroom teachers administered the California F Scale
and Schroder's Paragraph Completion Test in one session to
eliminate testing bias; and the experimenter, introduced
simply as from Loyola University, administered the conceptformation task on a different day in the same homeroom.
Subjects were not aware that the two sessions were related,
~·

The stimuli employed in the intentional and in-

cidental concept-learning tasks were adopted from Underwood
and Richardson's (1956) article.

These authors attempted to

develop standardized test materials for incorporation in verbal
concept-formation studies by determining the frequency of
response tendencies to common verbal stimuli.

All stimuli were
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nouns; and all responses were restricted to sense impressions
only, for example, cold, small, or sharp.

The percentage of

college participants replying with a particular one-word
association to a singly-presented stimulus was considered an
index of the associative strength of the response to the stimulus noun.
For the first level of input complexity, the task materials
were identical to those employed by Laughlin (1967).

Ten sets

of six nouns each were composed with four words in each set
exemplifying the same concept, designated for the intentional
concept-formation task.

This meant that all four words emitted

the same associative response in a high percentage of subjects
in the Underwood and Richardson study.

For example, subjects

responded with the term sharE when presented with the four words
knife, hatchet, fang, and tack.

Thus these nouns were con-

sidered exemplars of the concept sharp.
each set also represented a concept.

The other two words in

This concept was totally

unrelated to the first one and was designated for the incidental concept-formation task.
For the second level of information input (eight words per
list} and for the third level of input complexity (ten words
per list), additional intentional concept words, acquired from
Underwood and Richardson, were randomly inserted into the basic
list of six nouns used for the first level.

All tasl{ words

were randomly arranged within each set; and all ten sets were
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randomly arranged for each trial.

Sequences, however, remained

constant over the various levels of information; and all
incidental concept words were identical for all three conditions.

The ten sets of six, eight, and ten stimulus words

(four, six, or eight for the intentional concept-formation
task and the two words for the incidental concept-formation
task) are presented in table 1.
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Table 1
Stimulus Words for Intentional and Incidental
Concept-Learning Tasks

Set

Intentional
Concept

Incidental
Concept

1

(Smelly)
First Level
ammonia(88T
manure(BJ)
garbage ( 80)
skunk(78)

(Cold)

2

3

Set

Intentional
Concept

Incidental
Conce;et

6

(Round)
First Level
globe(95)
wheel(94)
spool(74)
baseball(70)

(Sour)

frost(54)
icicle(45)

Second Level
formaldehyde(81)
sewer(61)

Second Level
barrel ( '72 )
button(61)

Third Level
ether(70)
turpentine(67)

Third Level
dome ( 70)
balloon(55)

(Green)
First Level
spinach(90)
grass(88)
ivy(8J)
lawn(77)

(Spicy)

7

ginger(40)
clove(J2)

(Dark)
First Level
night(90)
dungeon(67)
closet(64)
tunnel ( 54·)

Second Level
moss(52r-pine tree(25)

Second Level
cave(66)
alley(49)

Third Level
grasshopper(55)
seaweed(49)

Third Level
hallway(l6l
forest(l4)

(Red)
First Level
blush(96)
beet(87)
cherry(77)
e..pple(67)

(Hard)
stone(63)
knuckle(62)

8

(Sharp)
First Level
knife(84)
hatchet(??)
fang(75)
tack( 6L1-)

vinegar(68)
sauerkraut(41)

(Slimy).
eel(68)
lizard(51)

(Black)
coal (85)
telephone(65)

19.

4

5

Second Level
blood{91)
tomato( SJ)

Second Level
fishhook(70)
spear(68)

Third Level
cranberry(69)
lips(59)

Third Level
pin{55}
dagger(70)

(Small)
First Level
atom(s7i-flea(86)
germ(84)
gnat(76)

(Yellow)

9

canary(82)
dandelion(85)

(White)
First Level
milk(8J)
teeth(72)
snow(?l)
1vory(65)

(Soft)
p1llow(87)
velvet(67)

Second Level
crumb{79)
minnow(62)

Second Level
'Cha1iCTsor-napkin(62)

Third Level
village(74)
mouse(54)

'I'hird Level
cauliflo'Wer( 64)
pearl(J?)

(Shiny)
First Level
jewel(67)
diamond(65)
aluminum(59)
badge(J2)

(Bro1'm)
tobacco(8J)
chocolate(61)

10

(Large)
(Sweet)
First Level
sugar(82)
ocean(JJ)
mansion( SJ)
honey(49)
elephant(8J)
auditorium(84)

Second Level
rhinestone(67)
buckle(J2)

Second Level
stadiumT?ST"
city(?2)

Third Level

Third Level
whale( 77)
boulder(46)

ariiiOr c2s>

bracelet(25)

Note.- Numbers in parentheses represent the percentage of
subjects classifying each stimulus word in the designated
category (Underwood & Richardson, 1956).
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Procedure and instructions.

Subjects were initially

administered the California F Scale (Adorno et al., 1950) and
Schroder's Paragraph Completion Test (Schroder and Streufert,
196J) in groups ranging from JO to 45 students.

The instruc-

tions for the cognitive complexity test were:
Below are listed six sentence stems.

Your task

is to write two or three sentences in response
to each stem.

You will have approximately li

minutes to write on each stem.

(Actually sub-

jects received 120 seconds for each stem.)
Please work rapidly.
After completion of this task, subjects were given ten minutes
to finish the authoritarianism test.

The instructions at the

beginning of the questionnaire were:
Here are some statements with which many people
agree and many other people disagree.

Will you

show how much you agree or disagree with each
statement by placing a number in front of each
statement.

The numbers mean the following:

+3 strong support, agreement
+2

moderate support, agreement

+l

slight support, a.greement

-1

slight opposition, disagreement

-2

moderate opposition, disa.greement

-J

strong opposition, disagreement
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Be sure to use a plus or minus sign in front
of your number to show whether you are agreeing or disagreeing with the statement.

The

number itself will show how strongly you agree or disagree.

Work fast-----just give

your first reaction.
Upon completion, the test booklets were collected and students
were permitted to resume their normal activity.
One to two weeks later the concept-formation task was
administered to three groups of 48 students.

Each subject

received a test booklet and instructions to learn only the intentional concept.

However, since all stimuli were presented

verbally, the incidental and the intentional concept words were
delivered together.

Specifically, the instructions on the

booklet were:
Six (eight, ten) words will be pronounced
aloud.

Four (six, eight) of these six

(eight, ten) words will go together in some
way.

These four (six, eight) words exem-

plify a concept.

Listen carefully to all

six (eight, ten) words, and then

fig~re

out the concept or the way in which four
(six, eight) of the six (eight, ten) words
are related.
in the blank.

~hen

write the concept word

For example, consider the
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following six (eight, ten) words: "mathematics, physics, house, sociology, history,
gymnasium" (philosophy, chemistry; english,
religion).

The four (six, eight) words that

go together in some way are ''mathematics",
"physics", ''sociology", and "history"
("philosophy", "chemistry"; "english",
"religion") because they are all "subjects".
Thus, the concept is "subjects", and you
would write "subjects" in the blank provided.
Do not turn each page until you are instructed
to do so.
Subjects were asked to read the instructions while the experimenter delivered them verbally.

All instructions were

identical for the three experimental groups except for the
indicated adjustments necessitated by the variation in the
amount of presented stimuli.
All ten sets of task words were read four times to each
group in a steady monotone with ten seconds between each set
and approximately fifteen seconds between each trial.

Each

subject was required to write her responses for all sets of one
trial on a separate page.

After the last trial, the directions

on the last page were:
Now, the four (six, eight) words that exemplified each concept are given below.

--~-..---~-~------------------~--~·

wwww.www
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For each of the four (six, eight) words
try to recall the other two words that
were not pa.rt of the concept.

These two

words, however, were also like each other
in some way, and thus exemplified another
concept.

Write the two other words and

the concept they exemplified below in
the blanks provided.
A new random order of concept words and sets was employed in
the incidental concept-formation task.

Subjects were allowed

eight minutes to complete this task; after which, the booklets
were collected and students requested to remain silent regarding the details of the experiment.

Intelligence scores on the

SRA High School Placement Test were acquired from school files.

Results
Within each of the three information levels (six, eight,
or ten stimulus words), the 48 subjects were initially rankordered on conceptual complexity and subsequently divided into
high, medium, a:nd low thirds.

This resulted in a J x J facto-

rial design with the variables being: (a) information input
(six, eight, or ten) and (b) cognitive complexity (high, medium,
or low).

Means for the high, medium, and low cognitive groups

were 5.48, 4.17, and 2.98, respectively.

In addition, sub-

jects within each level were ranked on authoritarianism and
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divided into thirds.

This resulted in another 3 x 3 factorial

design with the variables: (a) information level (first,
second, or third), and (b) authoritarianism (high, medium, or
low).

Means for the three authoritative groups were 113.58

(high), 93.58 (medium), and 68.44 (low).

Finally, the same

subjects were rank-ordered on intelligence and a comparable
procedure used to acquire the high, medium, and low levels.
The means for these three groups were 125.08, 114.31, and
103.29, respectively.

This permitted a 3 x 3 factorial analysis

with variables: (a) information, and (b) intelligence (high,
medium, or low).
The three dependent variables were the number of correct
intentional and incidental concepts formed and the number of
incidental concept words recalled.

Statistical analysis on

each set of data included: (a) two-way analysis of variance for
information and cognitive complexity, (b) analysis of covariance
for information and cognitive complexity with intelligence as
covariate, (c) two-way analysis of variance for information and
authoritarianism, (d) two analyses of covariance for authoritarianism and information with intelligence as covariate in one
case and cognitive complexity as covariate in the other, (e)
two-way analysis of variance for information and intelligence,
and (f) analysis of covariance for information and intelligence
with cognitive complexity as covariate.
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Intentional Concent Formation
The mean number of correct intentional concepts for groups
differentiated on cognitive complexity, authoritarianism,
information input, and intelligence are presented in Table 2.
Summary tables for analyses of variance and covariance for
groups divided on cognitive complexity are given in Table

J.

A summary of the analysis of variance for groups differing on
authoritarianism is presented in Table 4 with the summary tables
for the analyses of covariance for groups differentiated on
authoritarianism located in Table 5.

Table 6 presents the

summary tables for analyses of variance and covariance for
the high, medium, and low intelligence groups.
Means for intentional concept formation for the high,
medium, and low cognitive complexity groups were J2.04, J0.33,
and 29.38 with the overall analyses of variance and covariance
resulting in nonsignificant differences.

In contrast, the means

for the first, second, and third level of information were

27079, 32.98, and 30.98.

Analysis of variance revealed a

significant effect for input load at the oOOl level, F (2, 135)

8.09.

The linear component of the overall trend was significant

at the .025 level, F (1, 135)

= 5.95,

as was the quadratic

component, F (1, 135) = 10.08, .E <.005.

However, it was noted

that the linear component accounted for only 37% of the variance
while the quadratic component accounted for 63% of the difference. · These differences remained

signific~nt

at the .001 level

=
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with analysis of covariance employing intelligence as the
covariate, F (2, 134)

= 8.46.

The adjusted means for the

three groups were 27.83, 32.91, and J0.91.

Duncan's multiple-

range test showed that the second level differed significantly
from the first level (E <.001), and

th~t

the third level

scored higher than the first level (£ <.05).

The second level

did not differ significantly from the third level.
Means for the high, medium, and low authoritative groups
were J2.8J, 29.77, and 29.15.

Overall analysis of variance

was not significant nor were the analyses of covariance using
intelligence and cognitive complexity as the covariates.
Results for information on the analyses of variance and
covariance (covariate: intelligence) were identical to those
discussed above.

On the analysis of covariance using cognitive

complexity as covariate, information input had a significant
effect at the .001 level, F (2, 134)

= 8011.

The adjusted

means for the three levels were 27.82, 33.02, and 30.90.
Duncan multiple-range test indicated: (a) the second level
differed from the first level(£ <.001), (b) the third level
differed from the first level (£ <.05), and (c) no difference
between the second and third levels.
Finally, the means for the high, medium, and low intelligence groups were 32.83, 29.77, and 29.15.

Overall analysis

of varle.nce resulted in a significant difference at the .Ol
level; F (2, 135)

= 4.92.

The differences remained significant
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with analysis of covariance (covariates cognitive complexity),
F (2, 1J4)

= 4.69, £

<.01.

A comparison of the adjusted means

showed that the high intelligence group (M

= )2.78)

differed

significantly from the low group (M = 29.19) at the .01 level;
that the medium intelligence group

(~

= 29.77)

differed from

the high group(£ <.05); and that there was no difference
between the low and medium groups.
In summary, the effect of information input remained
significant on all analyses, while cognitive complexity and
authoritarianism had no effect on results.

Groups differ-

entiated on intelligence differed significantly and this
difference remained with cognitive complexity as a covariate.
Further, none of the interactions on intentional concepts were
significant.
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Table 2
Mean Intentional Concept Formation for Groups Differentiated

on Cognitive Complexity, Authoritarianism, and
Intelligence with Varying Amounts
of Information Input

Information Input

Cognitive Complexity

Adjusted M Adjusted M
(IQ as
(CC as
covariate) covariate)

Level

Mean

31.75

First

27.79

27.83

27.82

30.33

29.98

Second

32.98

32 .91

33.02

29.38

30.02

Third

30.98

30.91

30.90

Level

Mean

High

32.04

Medium
Low

Adjusted M
(IQ as
covariate)

Authoritarianism

Intelligence

Adjusted M Adjusted M
(IQ as
(CC as
covariate) covariate)

Level

Mean

Adjusted N
(CC as
covariate)

Level

Mean

High

32.83

32.78

High

29.94

30.52

30.04

Medium

29.77

29.77

Medium

30.12

30.03

30.19

Low

29.15

29.19

Low

31.69

31.20

31.52

Note.-I1aximum intentional concept formation is 40.00.
The following abbreviations are used: IQ = intelligence; CC
cognitive complexity.

=

Table 3
Analyses of Variance and Covariance for Intentional
Concept Formation for Groups Differentiated
on Conceptual Complexity with Three
Levels of Information

Source

Analysis of Variance

Analysis of Covariance

-df

-df

-SS

-MS

-F

-SS

-.MS

-F

Information( I:

2 657.13 328.56 8.09*

2

Conceptual
Complexity(C)

2 175.17 87.58 2.16

2

98.62

49.31

1.32

I x C

4

4

111.31

27.83

.74

. 134 5009. 50

37.38

118.83

29.71

Error (wg)

135 5483.88

40.62

Total

143 6435.01
*.E <.001.

.73

632.83 316.42

142 5852.26

8.46*
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Table 4
Analysis of Variance for Intentional Concept Formation
for Groups Differentiated on Authoritarianism
with Three Levels of Information Input

Source

df

SS

MS

Information Input (I)

2

657.12

328.56

8.16*

Authoritarianism (A)

2

88.62

44.31

1.10

A x I

4

252.51

63.13

1.57

Error {wg)

135

5436.75

40.27

Total

143

6435.00

*.E <.001.

F
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Table 5

Analyses of Covariance for Intentional Concept Formation
for Groups Differentiated on Authoritarianism

with Varying Amounts of Information

Covariate:
Intelligence

Covariate:
Cognitive Complexity

Source

-df

Information

-SS

(I)

2

Author. (A)a

2

A x I

4 179.19

-MS

F

633.72 316.86 8.48*
32 .26 16.13

Error (wg)

134 5009.64

Total

142 5854.81

.43

44.79 1.20
37.38

-df
2
2

65.77

134 5410.72
142 6390.97

aAbbreviated form for authoritarianism.

-MS

-F

654.70 327.35 8.11*

4 259.78

*.E <.001.

-SS

J2.88

.81

64.95 1.61
40.J8
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Table 6
Analyses of Variance and Covariance for Intentional
Concept Formation for Groups Differentiated
on Intelligence with Three Levels
of Information Input

Analysis of Variance

Analysis of Covariance

Source

-df

-df

Information
Input {A)

2

Intelligence

-SS

-MS

-F

657.12 .328.56 8.64**

2 373.88 186.94 4.92*

(B)

A x B

4

269,38

Error (wg)

135 5134.62

Total

~4.3

*E <.01.

**..E <.001.

6435.00

67.34 1.77
38. 0.3

2

-SS

-MS

-F

655.08 327.54 8. ss~-*

2 .358.54 179.27 4.69*
4 264.81
1.34 5117.17
142 6395.60

66.20 1.73
.38.19
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Incidenta~

Concept Formation

The means on 1nc1dental concept formation for groups
differentiated on cognitive complexity, authoritarianism, intelligence, and information are presented in Table 7.

Summary

tables for analyses of variance and covariance for groups
distinguished on cognitive complexity are given in Table 9.
Table 10 contains the summary table for analysis of variance for
high, medium, and low authoritarianism groups with summary
tables for analyses of covariance for these same groups located
in Table 11.

A summary of the analyses of variance and co-

variance for groups differing on intelligence are presented in
Table 12.
Means for the high, medium, and low cognitive groups on the
number of correct incidental concepts formed were 1.92, 1.96,
and

l.OL~,

respectively.

Analysis of variance revealed that

the effect of cognitive complexity was significant at the .05
level.

However, this difference did not remain significant with

analysis of covariance employing intelligence as the covariate.
For information input, the first level had a mean of 2.38, the
second level 1.44, and the third level 1.10.

Overall analysis

of variance resulted in a significant difference at the .005
level, F (2, 135) = 5.80 which remained significant with
analysis of covariance, F (2, 134)

= 6.84,

E <.005 •. The

adjusted means for these three groups were: high
medium

= 1.41,

and low

= loll.

= 2.39,

Tbe results of Duncan multiple-
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range comparisons demonstrated that the first level differed
significantly from the third level (£ <.001), that the first
level scored higher than the second level at the .Ol level, and
that there was no difference between the second and third
levels.
Means for the high, medium and low authoritarianism groups
were 1.25, 1.35, and 2.31.

Analysis of variance showed that

the effect of authoritarianism was significant at the .01 level,
F (2, 135) = 4.72.

These differences remained significant with

analysis of covariance (covariate: intelligence), F (2, 134)
2.79, E.

~.06;

=

and analysis of covariance with cognitive complex-

ity as the covariate, F (2, 134)

= 4.16, E

<.025.

In the first

instance, the adjusted means for the three authoritative groups
were 1.48, l.Jl, and 2.12.

Comparisons indicated that there

were no differences between the medium and high authoritative
groups nor between the low and high groups but that the low
group differed significantly from the medium group at the .05
level.

The adjusted means for the high, medium, and low

authoritarianism groups when cognitive complexity was used as
covariate were 1.28, 1.37, and 2.26, respectively.

Duncan's

multiple-range test revealed that the low group differed from
both the high and the medium groups at the

.05 level and that

there was no difference between the medium and high groups.
Results for information input on the analyses of variance
and covariance with intelligence as covariate were basically

35·
identical to those discussed above.

On analysis of covariance

employing cognitive complexity as covariate, the effect of input
was significant at the 0005 level, F (2, 134)

= 6.04.

The

adjusted means for these three levels were 2.38, 1.44, and 1.09.
Comparisons showed that the first level differed from the third
level at the

.005 level, that the difference between the first

and second levels was significant at the

.05 level, and that the

second and third levels did not differ significantly.
The mean for the high intelligence group was 2.56, for the
medium group 1.56, and for the low group .79.

Overall analysis

of variance resulted in significant difference at the .001
level, F (2, 135)

= 12031.

With analysis of covariance

(covariate: cognitive complexity), the difference remained
significant at the same level, F (2, 134)

= 11,87.

Duncan's

test performed on the adjusted means indicated that the low
intelligence group (M = .81) differed from the high group
(M

= 2.54)

at the .001 level, that the high group differed from

the medium group (M = 1.56),

£ <.01, and that the medium group

scored significantly higher than the low group at the
level.

.05

Since the interaction between intelligence and in-

formation l'ras significant at the .05 level in the analysis of
variance and covariance, Table 8 contains the individual cell
means,

Comparisons demonstrated that the first level-high

intelligence group diff ercd significantly from all other groups

.

(.E, <,001) and that no other differences were significant.
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In summary, the effect of information input upon incidental
concept formation was significant in all analyses; while the
difference between cognitive complexity groups was initially
significant but did not remain with intelligence as a covariate.
Groups differentiated on the basis of authoritarianism were
significantly different even when intelligence and cognitive
complexity were employed as covariates.

Finally, the effect

of intelligence was significant and this difference remained
with cognitive complexity as a covariate.

The only significant

interaction in the entire experiment was between intelligence
and information but this only indicated that low input and
high intelligence affected performance.
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Table 7
Mean Incidental Concept Formation for Groups Differentiated
on Cognitive Complexity, Authoritarianism, and
Intelligence with Varying Amounts
of Information Input

Cognitive ComElexity
Level

Mean

High

1.92

Medium
Low

Information InEut

Adjusted M
(IQ as
covariate)

Level

Mean

1.81

First

2.38

2.39

2.38

1.96

1.82

Second

1.44

1.41

1.44

1.04

1.29

Third

1.10

loll

1.09

Intelligence
Level

Mean

High

2.56

Medium
Low

Adjusted M Adjusted M
(IQ as
(CC as
covariate) cove.ria te)

Authoritarianism

Adjusted M
(CC as
covariate)

Level

Mean

Adjusted M Adjusted M
(IQ as
(CC as
covariate)
covariate)

2.54

High

1.25

1.48

1.28

1.56

1.56

Medium

1.35

1.31

1.37

.79

.81

Low

2.31

2.12

2.26

------Note.-.Maximum incidental concept formation is 10.00.
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Table 8
Individual Cell Means from the Two-Way Analysis
for Incidental Concept Formation

Intelligence
High

Medium

Low

Information
Input

Mean Adjusted M Mean Adjusted M Mean Adjusted M
(CC as
(CC as
(CC as
covariate)
covariate)
covariate)

First Level

4.19

4.19

2.00

2.02

.94

.94

Second Level

1.81

1.81

1.69

1.68

.81

.85

Third Level

1.69

1.66

1.00

.99

.62

.61
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Table 9
Analyses of Variance and Covariance for Incidental
Concept Formation for Groups Differentiated
on Conceptual Complexity with Three
Levels of Information

Analysis of Variance
Source

df

SS

MS

Information
(I)

2 41.68

Conceptual
Complexity
(C)

2

I x C

4 10.69

2.67

Error (wg)

135 485.12

3.59

Total

143 563.22

*.E <.05.
**.E <.005.

25.72

F

Analysis of Covariance
df

SS

MS

F

20.84 5.80**

2

42.77

21.38 6.84**

12.86 J.58*

2

9.12

4.56 1.46

·4

5.63

1.41

1J4 418.67

3.12

.74

142

476.19

.45
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Table 10
Analysis of Variance for Incidental Concept Formation
for Groups Differentiated on Authoritarianism
with Varying Levels of Information

Source

df

SS

MS

F

Information (I)

2

41.68

20.84

5°97**

Authoritarianism (A)

2

J2.9J

16.46

4.72*

Ax I

4

16.99

4.25

1.22

Error {wg)

135

471.62

3.49

Total

14J

563.22

*.E <.01.

**E

<.005.
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Table 11
Analyses of Covariance for Incidental Concept Formation for
Groups Differentiated on Authoritarianism with
Three Levels of Information Input

Covariate:
Cognitive Complexity

Covariate:
Intelligence
Source

df

SS

MS

F

Information
(I)

2

42.74 21.37 7.0l****

Author. (A)a

2

17.03

A x I

4

7.29

1.82

Error (wg)

134 409.35

3.05

Total

142 476.41

8.52 2. 79·:1.60

df

SS

-MS

F

2

42.44 21.22 6.04***

2

29.26 14.63 4.16**

4

17.34

134 470.77
142 559.81

aAbbreviated form for authoritarianism.
*E ~.06.
**E <.025.
*i:·*E <.005.
****E <.001.

4.34 1.23
3.51
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Table 12
Analyses of Variance and Covariance for Incidental
Concept Formation for Groups Differentiated
on Intelligence with Varying Levels
of Information Input

Analysis of Variance
Source

df

SS

MS

F

Analysis of Covariance
df

SS

MS

F

Information
Input (A)

2 41.68 20.84

Intelligence
{B)

2 75.68 37.84 12.31***

2

73.23 36.62 11.87***

Ax B

4

4

31.23

7.81

134 413.27

J.08

30.99 7.75

Error (wg)

135 414.88

Total

143 563.22

*E <.05.
**E <.005.
***E <.001.

3.07

6.78**

2.52*

2 42.84 21.42

142 560.57

6.95***

2.53*
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Incidental £oncept Words
The mean number of incidental concept words recalled by
groups differentiated on cognitive complexity, authoritarianism,
j_nformation, and intelligence are given in Table 1.3.

Table

14 contains the summary tables for the analyses of variance and
covariance performed on various cognitive groups,

A summary

of the analysis of variance for groups differing on authoritarianism is given in Table 15; while Table 16 presents the
summary tables for the analyses of covariance for these groups.
Lastly, summary tables for analyses of variance and covariance
for groups distinguished on the basis of intelligence are
located in Table 17.
The means for the high, medium and low cognitive groups
were 5.23, 5.27, and ).52, respectively.

Analysis of variance

demonstrated that cognitive structure had a significant effect
at the .025 level, F (2, 135) = 3.95.

However, this signif-

icance was lost with analysis of covariance employing
intelligence as a covariate.

In contrast, the effect of in-

formation was significant at the .005 level with analysis of
variance, F (2, 135) = 6.44, and at the .001 level with analysis
of covariance {covariate: intelligence), F (2, 1J4)

= 7.12.

The means for the three levels of input were 6,00, 4.56, and
3.46; and the adjusted means were 6.02 (first), 4.52 (second),
and 3.47 (third).
was no

differ~nce

Multiple comparisons revealed that there
between the sec9nd and third levels, but that
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the difference between the first and the third levels was
significant (E <.001), and between the first and second levels
at the

.05 level.

The mean for the high authoritarianism group was 3.96, for
the medium group 4.06, and for the low level 6.oo.

Overall

analysis of variance was significant (F (2, 135) = 5.36,

E <.005) as were the analyses of covariance with intelligence
as covariate (F (2, 134) = 3.57, E <.05) and with cognitive
complexity as covariate (F (2, 134)

= 4.76,

£ <.01).

The

adjusted means in the first instance (intelligence as covariate)
were 4.JO, 4.01, and 5.71 for the three groups.

Duncan's

multiple-range test showed that the low group differed significantly from both the high and the medium groups at the

.05

level and that there was no difference between the medium and
the high group.

With cognitive complexity as covariate, the

adjusted means were 4.02, 4.10, and 5.90.

The resultant

comparisons were similar to those for intelligence as covariate.
Results for information input on the analyses of variance
and covariance (covariate: intelligence) were identical to
those discussed previously.

On analysis of covariance with

cognitive complexity as the covariate, the effect of input was
significant at the

.005 level, F (2, 134) = 6.66.

means for the three levels weres first
and third

= 3.44.

= 6.0l,

The adjusted

second

= 4.57,

Comparisons indicated that the first level

differed from the third level at the

.001-lev~l,

that

th~

first

level performed better than the second level (I?. <,05), and
that there was no difference between the second and third
levels.
For groups differentiated on the basis of intelligence,
the high group had a mean of 5,98, the medium 4.69, and the low

3.35,

Overall analysis of variance resulted in a significant

difference at the ,001 level, F (2, 135) = 7,42,

This

significant difference was maintained with analysis of
covariance employing cognitive complexity as the covariate,
F (2, 134)

= 7,10,

.E <,001.

Duncan multiple-range comparisons

on adjusted means revealed that the high group (M

= 5.95)

differed significantly from the low group (M = 3,38) at the
,001 level, and that the medium group (M

= 4.69)

differed from

neither the low nor the high group.
In summary, the effect of information was significant in
all analyses, while all interactions involving recalled incidental words were nonsignificant.

Groups differentiated on

cognitive complexity were initially significant; however, this
difference did not remain with intelligence as a covariate.
High, medium, and low authoritative groups differed significantly even when intelligence and cognitive complexity were
employed as covariates,

Finally, the effect of intelligence

was significant and this difference was maintained with
cognitive complexity as a covariate,
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Table 1.3
Mean Quantity of Incidental Concept Words Recalled for
Groups Differentiated on Cognitive Complexity,
Authoritarianism, and Intelligence with
Varying Levels of Information Input

Cognitive Complexity

Information Input

Level

Mean

Adjusted M
(IQ as
covariate)

Level

Nean

Adjusted M Adjusted M
- (CC as
(IQ as
covariate) covariate)

High

5.23

5.05

First

6.oo

6.02

6.01

Medium

5.27

5.06

Second

4.56

4.52

4.57

Low

J.52

J.91

Third

J.46

3.47

J.44

Authoritarianism

Intelligence
Level

Mean

Adjusted M
(CC as
covariate)

Level

Mean

Adjusted M Adjusted M
(IQ as
- (CC as
covariate) covariate)

High

5.98

5.95

High

J.96

4.30

4.02

Medium

4.69

4.69

Medium

4.06

4.01

4.10

Low

3.35

3.38

Low

6.oo

5.71

5.90

Note.-Naximum incidental concept words is 20.00.
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Table 14
Analyses of Variance and Covariance for Quantity of Incidental
Concept Words Recalled for Groups Differentiated on
Conceptual Complexity with Varying Amounts
of Information

Analysis of Covariance

Analysis of Variance
Source

-df

Information
(I)

-SS

-MS

-F

-df

-SS

-MS

-F

2

155.93 77.96 6.44**

2

Conceptual
Complexity
(C)

2

95.72 47.86 J.95*

2

44.18 22.09 1.99

I x C

4

42.07 10.52

4

31.07

.87

157.67 78.84 7.12***

7.77

Error (wg)

135 1633.94 12.10

134 1484.)2 11.08

Total

143 1927.66

142 1717.24

*£ <.025.
**£ <.005.
***£ <.001.

.70
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Table 15
Analysis of Variance for Quantity of Incidental Concept
Words Recalled for Groups Differentiated on
Authoritarianism with Three Levels
of Information Input

Source

df

SS

-MS

E

Information Input (I)

2

155.93

77.96

6.58*

Authoritarianism (A)

2

126.93

63.46

5.36*

A x I

4

44.99

11.25

.95

Error (wg)

135

1599.81

11.85

Total

143

1927. 66

*£ <.005.

Table 16
Analyses of Covariance for Quantity of Incidental Concept
Words Recalled for Groups Differentiated on
Authoritarianism with Three Levels
of Information

Covariate:
Cognitive Complexity

Covariate a
Intelligence
Source

df

SS

MS

F

Information

(I)

df

SS

MS

2 157.66 78.83 7.25****

2 158.72 79,36 6.66***
2 113,35 56.68 4.76**

Author. (A) a

2

77.57 J8.78 J.57*

A x I

4

26.00

6.50

.60

4

46.J4 11.59

Error (wg)

134 1456.51 10.87

134 1596.93 11.92

Total

142 1717.74

142 1915.34

aAbbreviated form for authoritarianism,

*E <,05,
**E <,01.
***£ <.005.
****E <,001.

-F

.97
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Table 17
Analyses of Variance and Covariance for Quantity of Incidental
Concept Words Recalled for Groups Differentiated
on Intelligence with Varying Amounts
of Information Input

Analysis of Variance
Source
Information
Input (A)

df

Ax B

MS

F

2 155.93 77.96 6.99*

Intelligence
(B)

SS

2

165.39 82.69 7.42*

4 101.90 25.48 2.29

Analysis of Covariance
df

SS

MS

2 160.63 80.31 7.18*
2

158.89 79.44 7.10*

4 101.37 25.34 2.27

Error (wg)

135 1504.44 11.14

134 1498.72 11.18

Total

143 1927.66

142 1919.61

*£ <.001.

F
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Interrelationships of Variables
Table 18 presents the intercorrelations between the dependent variables and the three personality variables involved in
the preceding analyses for the entire group of 144 subjects.
Cognitive complexity scores correlated .08 with intentional
concept formation, .06 with incidental concepts formed, and

.05 with amount of incidental words recalled.

Intelligence

scores, on the other hand, correlated .30 and .39 with intentional and incidental concept formation respectively, and

.33 with quantity of recalled words.

Scores on the F Scale

correlated -.12 with intentional concept formation, -.23 with
incidental concept formation, and -.24 with incidental words
recalled.

Intentional and incidental concept formation

correlated .19; and incidental concept formation correlated

.89 with the amount of incidental words recalled.

Finally,

cognitive complexity correlated -.20 with authoritarianism and
.11 with intelligence scores.
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Table 18
Intercorrelations Between the Dependent Variables
and the Three Personality Variables

Int
IcW
IcC
IQ
F

IcW

IcC

IQ

F

cc

.24

.19

.JO
.JJ

-.12

.08

-.24

.05

.39

-.23

.06

-.23

.11

.89

-.20

Note.-Abbreviat1ons represents intentional concept formation (Int), incidental concept words (IcW), incidental concept
formation (Ice), intelligence (IQ), author1tarian1sm (F),
cognitive complexity (CC).

53.
Discussion
The hypothesis predicting no difference between abstract
and concrete conceptual structures on intentional concept
formation was substantiated.

This would seem to indicate that

both types possess similar abilities in processing relevant
cues; and that in a situation demanding minimal integrative
processes, simple structures function as effectively as highlevel individuals.

This finding coincides with Schroder's

(1967) contention that equality will exist between levels if
sufficient material is delivered to the subject and if appropriate performance requirements are explicitly stated.
Contrary to our prediction, high-level subjects did not
perform significantly better than simple-level individuals on
incidental concept formation.

This result may be attributed to

either the inappropriateness of the task environment or to the
validity of the Paragraph Completion Test.

In the first case,

Schroder states in his book (1967) that overly simple task
situations often fail to stimulate processes of integration,
therefore permitting low-level structures to function effectively.

Streufert and Schroder (1965) further clarified this

statement by demonstrating that two to five units of information
represent suboptimal loads for processing procedures.

In this

experiment, there were only two incidental words which may
have allowed low-level individuals to perform as effectively
as more complex persons.

However, the legitimacy of this
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criticism can be questioned by noting (a) that the mean performances on the intentional and incidental concept formation
tasks were very low (see Tables 2 and 7), thereby indicating
that the tasks were not "overly simple"; and (b) that Schroder
considers complexly-integrative persons to be highly creative.
Laughlin (1967), employing a similar procedure, analyzed the
effect of creativity and found that high creatives exceeded
medium and low creatives.

Therefore, if Schroder's assumption

is correct, the task should have been sufficient; and on this
basis, our results should have been significant.
The second plausible explanation questions the validity of
Schroder's test.

It is a confirmed fact that intelligence is

significantly correlated with complexity (ol2 to .45); and
therefore, several investigators postulate that the two may be
identical.

Schroder (1967) denies this by noting that his

research discovered variations in cognitive structures while
maintaining intelligence at a constant level and by explicating
that intelligence is a general abil:tty while conceptual level
varies across content areas.

The present results tend to con-

firm this statement since the correlation between these two
traits was only .11.

Consequently, even thougp employing

intelligence as a covariate eliminated the initially significant
results, stating that the two are identical fails to fully
satisfy our problem.
The answer appears to involve the ability of the test to
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actually determine a person's processing capabilities in any
situation.

Since this conceptual structure supposedly varies

across stimulus areas, the test form administered in this
project may have analyzed a person's ability for the wrong
area.

This is certainly a parsimonious solution to a complex

problem but not very meaningful.

The basic problem involves

Schroder and his associates' attempt to measure some entity
which currently refuses quantification.

Their analysis that the

relational aspects of an individual's operations upon input
information is more significant than the pure content of the
input is definitely a correct postulation.

However, their

measuring instrument reeks with simplicity when one realizes
that its purpose is to analyze a complex entity that constantly
varies.

Consequently, their endeavor is noteworthy but

certainly one that does not even approach the final solution.
For the variable of information load, the results demonstrated that a curvilinear relationship exists between quantity
of relevant material and performance on the intentional concept
formation task.

This suggests that an input load of eight

concept exemplars, in contrast to only six, offers the subject
additional cues which may be employed in the categorization of
stimuli.

This effect is similar to that discovered by Bourne

and Haygood (1961) and is actually a further extension of
Walker and Bourne's (1961) distinction between the two uses of
the word "redund&ncy".

In this experiment, the relevant
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redundant information did not require the subject to employ
additional information in the classification of material nor
did it necessarily permit the participant to employ any one of
several dimensions but it actually increased the identification
(or saliency) of the concept by repeating it through added
exemplars.
However, this rate of improvement did not continue for
loads of ten exemplars which, in fact, produced a decrement in
performance.

Even though this decline was not significant, the

overall trend analysis indicated that the larger input may
represent an overloading of incoming information.

In this

instance, the individual is not able to assimilate the particular quantity of material in a specified time period; and
therefore, fails to utilize the additional cues that could be
at his disposal.

In actuality, the overloading condition causes

a "jamming" of information systems, prohibits normal functioning, and thus, decreases concept identification.

Streufert

and Driver (1965) concluded that excessive information loads
decrease differentiation and integration and Garner (1962)
found that information transmission initially increases and
then declines as the load becomes larger.

Lanzetta and Roby

(1957) similarly determined that a decrement occurs in processing highly complex information, while Hyman (195.3) certified
that reaction time increases as input in bits increases.
conclusion, the suggestion can be.formulated that further

In
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experimentation on intentional concept identification should
include stimulus lists of eight words instead of six to permit
maximum performance.

This may promote intentional concept

formation as a better measure than currently accepted in
learning research.
On incidental concept formation, the prediction that added
quantities of irrelevant information decrease identification
was substantiated.

Since on this task, the intentional concept

words were processed as irrelevant material and the incidental
exemplars as relevant input, this effect augments Bourne and
Haygood's (1959) formulation that redundant irrelevant information increases the saliency of the irrelevant cues and thus
limits performance.

In the same realm, Murdock's (1965)

''limited capacity" hypothesis lends some explanatory assistance
by theorizing that a constant amount of material can be retained
or learned in a constant period of time.

Likewise, Wolfgang

(1967) confirmed the assumption that learning rate decreases
with increased amounts of irrelevant input.

This suggests that

since an individual's storage capabilities may possess limitations, a subject stores only relevant information and therefore
is unable to recall later requested incidental material.
Laughlin (1967) and Laughlin, Doherty, and Dunn (1968) likewise found that stimulus lists of six nouns allow efficient
performance on incidental concept formation.
Regarding the effect of authoritarianism, the findings
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showed that no differences occurred between groups on intentional concept identification.

This confirmed the hypothesis

that all levels should demonstrate equal proficiency in
learning basic material where instructional stimuli are
explicitly stated, where presentation of information is clear,
and where no cognitive shifts are required.

In contrast, low

authoritative individuals performed significantly better than
other persons on incidental concept formation.

Since subjects

were required to shift from an intentional-learning set to an
incidental concept attainment task, these results confirm
Rokeach's (1948) discovery that relatively high F persons
exhibit an inability of shifting from established sets.

Like-

wise, these people maintain strict rigidity in their thinking,
denoting that the subject would focus his attention only on
the relevant information, would immediately screen out nonessential input during presentation, and therefore would be
unable to complete the incidental task.
This trend continued when intelligence and cognitive
complexity were employed as covariates.

In the first case, the

difference was less significant indicating that the cognitive
style measured by the Authoritarianism Scale overlapped with
that ability analyzed by the intelligence test.

This effect

was particularily noticeable in the multiple-range comparisons
wher~

the low group differed from the medium but not from the

high group.

With integrative

abi~ity

as covaT.iate, the level
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of significance was only minimally affected.

This denoted that

the two tests concentrated on two basically unrelated processes.
This latter conclusion was further supported with the correlation coefficient being only -.20, confirming Schroder's

(1967) contention that the relationship between authoritarianism
and cognitive structure is anything but clear-cut.
For intentional concept formation, intelligence was the
only personality variable that had a significant effect which
coincides with the findings of Laughlin, Doherty, and Dunn

(1968).

Comprehension of this conclusion may occur by realizing

that intentional learning procedures closely resemble those
of the academic situation and that Wallach and Kogan (1965)
proposed that intelligence is a direct predictor of academic
achievement.

In the same manner, intelligence significantly

affected performance on incidental concept formation and recall
of incidental stimuli.

This result replicates the findings

of Laughlin and his associates (1968) and substantially
indicates that the ability to form, identify, and recall
relationships for high school students is highly dependent
upon intelligence.

It also presents the possibility that this

type of task taps an individual's processes for storing and
retrieving information more than his procedures for processing
input data; and that if intelligence basically represents the
ability to store and retrieve material, the effect on both
types of Jearning wm1J.d be

sign~

ficant.
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The interaction between information input and intelligence
on incidental learning offers little insight into the processes
entailed since the only difference occurred between the low
level-high intelligence group and the remaining groups.

This

simply suggests highly intelligent persons are capable of
efficiently processing, storing, and retrieving minimal loads of
information better than less intelligent people with larger
input lists.
In general, this experiment demonstrated that intentional
and incidental learning are not dependent upon the integrative
ability of the individual but do rely upon the amount of stimuli
presented for processing in a limited time period.

The the-

oretical explanation forwarded by Deese (1964) received some
confirmation since additional intentional words should assist
in the development of numerous similar representational responses; and assuming the accuracy of Nurdock's (1965) "limited
capacity" formulation, these intentional representations should
restrict those for incidental matter and subsequently degrade
performance.

Statements by various investigators (Miller &

Lakso, 1964; Wray, 1967; Schneider & Kintz, 1967) noting the
element of attention in learning and retention and specifically
Plenderleith and Postman's (1956) position that success in
incidental learning corresponds with a person's ability to
maintain attention on multiple phases of the information input
were tentatively supported by the fact that low authoritative
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individuals were more proficient in their identifications than
ether participants in the project.

This report also affirmed

the role of intelligence in the analysis of both types of
learning and emphasized that all future experimentation must
recognize and control the presence of this factor.

Negligence

on this point suggests that some past research might be susceptible to criticism.

62.
References
Adorno, T.

W~,

Frenkel-Brunswik, Else, Levinson, D. J,, &

Sanfor1, R. W.

'i'he §-Uthoritarianism personality.

York: Harper and Row,

New

1950.

Altra, E. Ricerche sull apprendimento senzo consapevolezza.
(Studies of learning without awareness.) Riv. Psicol. ~··

1960, 7, 103-109.
Amster, Harriet.

(Psychological Abstracts,

Effect of instructional set and variety of

instances on children's learning.
Psychology,

1960)

Journal of Educational

1966, 2J_ (2), 74-85.

Archer, E. J., Bourne, L. E., Jr., & Brown, F. G.

Concept

identification as a function of irrelevant information and
instruction.

Journal of

Exp~rimental

Fsycholo~y,

1955,

49, 153-164.
Bourne, L. E., Jr.

Effects of delay of information feedback and

task complexity on the identification of concepts.
Journal of Experimental Psychology,
Bourne, L. E., Jr., & Haygood, R.

c.

1957

?~ychol_of3Y._,

2!±., 201-207.

The role of stimulus

redundancy in concept identification.
Experimental

1

Journal of

1959, .2§_, 232-238.

Bourne, L. E., Jr., & Haygood, R. C,

Supplementary report:

Effect of redundant relevant information upon the identification of concepts.

Journal of

Experimenta~ Psycholo~Y-·

1961, 61, 259-260.
Bourne,

L~

E., Jr., & Pendleton, R. B.

Concept identification

63.
References - Cont.
as a function of completeness and probability of information feedback.

Journal of Experimental Psychologr,

1958, ..2.§_, 413-420.
Brown, R. W.

A determinant of the relationship between rigidity

and authoritarianism.
Ps~rchol oez,

Brown, R.

Journal of Abnormal and Social

19 53, 48, 469-476.
New York: The Free Press, 1965.

Social psycholog_;y_.

Bulgarella, Rosaria, & Archer, E. J.

Concept identification of

auditory stimuli as a function of amount of relevant and
irrelevant information.

Journal of Experimental Psychology,

1962, §2_, 254-257.
Burnstein, E.

Intentional and incidental learning as a function

of selection processes.

Dissertation

Abstra~t~,

1960,

21, 371.
Byers, J. L., & Davidson, R. E.

Relevant and irrelevant in-

formation in concept attainment.

Journal of Experimental

Psychology, 1968, 76, 28J-287.
Chapanis, A.

The reconstruction of abbreviated printed
Journal of Experimental Psycholoeil, 1954, 48,

messages.

496-5100
Cohen, D. B.

A study of the correlation between the use of

incidental stimuli to facilitate learning and selected
personality traits.

(1), 11-14.

Journal of

~~l·

1966, 62

.

..,.._.._.._~.-----·-·~=-----._.,,.------

64.
References - Cont,
Davids, A.

The influence of ego-involvement on relations

between authoritarianism and intolerance of ambiguity,
Journal .9.£
Deese, J.

Consultin~

Psychologl, 1956, 20, 179-184.

Behavioral effects of instructions to learn: Comments

w.

on Professor Postman's paper.

In A.

Melton (Ed.),

Categories of human 1_earninfi.

New York: Acadsmic Press,

1964, Pp. 202-209.
Denny, P. J,, & Gamlin, P.

Memory load and form of information

input as determinant's of proficiency in concept formation.
Proceedin~

of the 1}r£ Annual Convention of

Psychologi.cal
Dey, M, K.
of set.

~!3socia tJ:__£Q,

~

American

1965, 93-94.

Incidental learning as the result of generalization
Acta

Psycholo~ica,

Amsterdam, 1965, 24 (5), 423-

429.
Dornbush, Rhea L., & Winnick, Wilma A.
and incidental learning.
Rsychologl, 1967,
Eagle, M., & Leiter, E.

12•

Journal of Experimental

608-611.

Recall and recognition in intentional

and incidental learning.
Psychol~EZ•

Short-term intentional

Journal. of .§"i'.:Eerimental

1964, 68 (1), 58-63,

Easterbrook, J, A.

The effect of emotion on cue utilization

and the organization of behavior.

~~cholo8ical

B.£.!J..ew,

1959, 66, 183-201.
Garner, H.

Un.certa1.nty and

structu~ §-1?.. ~:ycho1.£c::Jc~J.:.

£.2.!2_ce12ts o

References - Cont.
New York: Wiley,

1962.

Goldstein, R., & Solomon, R. J.
"incidental learning".

1955 •

A serial position effect in

Journal of General Psychology,

.21· 293-298.

Greenwald, A. G., & Salrumura, J. S.

Attitude and selective

learning: Where are the phenomena of yesteryear?
of Personality and Social Psycholo~,
Gutjahr, W.

162, 223-237.

o.

1967, 1, 387-397.

Zur psychologie des sprachlichen gedachtnissess.

(on the psychology of verbal memory).

Harvey,

Journal

J.

(fsychologic~l Abstracts,

Psych..£1••

1958,

1960)

Personality factors in resolution of conceptual

incongruities.
Harvey, Oo J,

z.

Sociometry,

1962, gj_, 336-352.

Authoritarianism and conceptual functioning in

varied conditions.

Journal of Personalitr,

1963, l!.•

462-470.
Harvey,

o.

J,, & Beverly, G. D.

Some personality correlates of

concept change through role playing.
~Social

Harvey,

o.

Psychologx_,

1961, &J_, 125-130.

J., & Rutherford, J.

to attitude change.

Gradual and absolute approaches

Sociometry,

Haygood, Ro C,, & Bourne, L. E., Jr,

1958, 21, 61-68.
Forms of relevant stimulus

redundancy in concept identification.
Exp~rimen~!_ Psl_2hol~,

Haygo.od, R.

c.,

Journal of Abnormal

Journal of

1964, 67, 392-397.

& Stevenson, M,

Effects of number of irrelevant

66.
References - Cont.
dimensions in nonconjunctive concept learning.
of

~perimental

Hyman, R.
time.

psychol.2.gy, 1967,

Journal

1!±., 302-304.

Stimulus information as a determinant of reaction
Journal 9f

p;~perimental Ps~c0olog,y,

1953, !:£:i,

188-196.
Jackson, D. N., Messick,

s.

J., & Solley,

is the "authoritarian"?
Psycholo~,

1957,

~.

Karlins, M., & La.mm, H.

c.

M.

How "rigid"

Journal of Abnormal and Social

137-140.

Information search as a function of

conceptual structure in a complex problem-solving task.
Journal of Pe:i:_~~li!;y_ ~229:. ~E~<?J_~_l. f.SX£h.219J~Y..• 1967, .2_,

456-459.
Keele, S. W. ,

&

Archer, E. J.

A comparison of two types of

information in concept identification.

Journal of Verbal

Learning and Verbal Behavior, 1967, 6, 185-192.
Kenny, D. T., & Ginsberg, Rose.

Authoritarian submission

attitudes, intolerance of ambiguity and aggression.
Canadian Journal of
Kirloslmr, Shashikala,

&

P~ycholOKY•

1958, 12, 121-126.

Parameswaran, E. G.

irrelevant material on concept formation.
Bulletin of thl:_ Department of

~ycholo£l_,

Effect of
Research
Osmania U.,

1967, No. 3, 18-25.
Lanzetta, J. T., & Roby, T. B.

Group learning and communi-

cation as a function of task and structure "demands."

References - Cont.
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1957,

22• 121-

131.

Laughlin, P. R.

Incidental concept formation as a function of

creativity and intelligence.
Social Psychology, 1967,

Journal of Personal!!:x and

2• 115-119.

Laughlin, P. R., Doherty, Mary, & Dunn, R. R.

Intentional and

incidental concept formation as a function of motivation,
creativity, intelligence, and sex.

Journal of Personalitz

and Social Psychology, 1968, 8, 401-409.
Mayzner, M.

s., & Tresselt, M. E.

Incidental learning: A

function of associative strength and distance between S-R
pairs.

Jourm1l of Psych._olo£X_, 1962,

Mc Geoch, J. A.,
garni_ng.

&

Irion, A. L.

The

U•

155-160.

E~ycholoE?X

of human

(2nd ed.) New York: Longmans, Green, 1952.

Mc Guigan, F. J.

Incidental learning in the formation of
American JourEal of Psychologx, 1958, 11,

conceptso
539-547.
Mc Laughlin, B.

"Intentional" and ''incidental" learning

in human subjects: The role of instructions to learn and
motivation.
Mechanic, A.

Psycho;J.o_e;ical Bulletin,

196~,

.2)._, 359-376.

Effects of orienting task, practice and incentive

on simultaneous incidental and intentione,l learning.
Journal of E:JS~P~ri~j:;~l R~ichol.ogz, 1962, 64, 393-399.
Mechanic, A.

The distrj.bution of recalled items in simultaneou::>

68.
References - Cont.
intentional and incidental learning.
merimental f..~cho~pI£l_, 1962,
Mechanic, A.,

&

D'Andrea, Joanne.

§1

Journal of

(6), 593-600.

V:i.cual and pronouncing

re"~

sponses, and the relation between orienting task and
presentations in incidental learning.

Journ9..l of

~xper.J.

mental P~cholot:5.~· 1966, 11. (3), 343-.349.
Mechanic, Ao,

&

Meche.nic, Joanne D.

Response activities and

the mechanism of selectivity in incidental learning.
Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 1967, 6,

389-397.
Miller, M. E., & Lakso,

v.

Effects of constant versus varied

pairing of simultaneous intentional-and incidentallearning materials with different rates a.nd number of
exposures.

Jour:na3=_ of p;xperimenta.l Psychologx, 196.l.i,, §.1,

256-262.
Milton, T. A.

Intolerance of ambiguity and rigidity under ego-

and task-involving conditions.
Social

~?~C?.!1ologz,

Hurdock, B. B., Jr.
esis.

1957,

Journal of Abnormal and
------ --

22• 29-33.

A test of the ''limited capacity" hypoth-

Journal of

Exp_~rime11tal PsycJ1.<_?lOf~·

196 5, 69,

237-240.
Newman, E. B., & Gerstrnan, L.
printed English.

1952, 44, 114-125.

s.

Jouri].a.l of

A new method for analyzing
~nte.l

Ps~..2-BY•

References - Cont.
Paradowski,

w.

Effect of curiosity on incidental learning.

2§. (1), 50-55·

Journal of Educational Psycholoe;y, 1967,
Plenderleith, No, & Postman, L.

Discriminative and verb9.l

habits in incidental lea1·ning.
Psy_E.holofil[, 1956,
P0Gtroan 1 L.
A.

w.

American Journal of

.£2, 236-243.

Short-term memory and incidental learning.
Melton (Ed.),

Cat!l£ori~s

of human lear12i!!£5..

In
New

York: Academic Press, 1964, Pp. 145-201.
Postman, L., & Adams, Pauline A.
ing.

VIII.

Studies in incidental learn-

The effects of contextual determination.

Jo1~.r..!L~± .o=f,, ~xpe,rJJPe~.t~J E~9holo_gy,

Postman, L., Adams, P. A.,
learning studies: II.

1960, 22• 153-164.

Phillips, L. W.

&

Incidental

The effects of associational value

and of the method of testing.

Journal of Experimenta.3=_

Psycholo_gy, 1955, 49, 1-10.

w.

Postman, L., & Phillips, L.

Incidental learning studies: I.

The effects of cronding and isolation.

Journal of

filerigi.snt§'-1. P_EXchologz, 1954·, 48, 48-54.
Postman, L., & Senders,
generality of set.

v.

L.

Incidental learning and

Jour~1

of

Ei,[p~tal Psychol2~ 1

1946, 36, 153-165.
Quartermain, D., & Scott, T. H.
task.

Cal}~ J 01rrE.§.:1

Rappaport, M.

of

Incidental learni.ng in a simple
~ycb~91oe.:y,

1960, 14, 17 5-182.

'rhe role of redundµncy in the discrimination of

70.
References - Cont.
visual forms.

.2J.,

Journal of

~_2CJ?e.!_1i~cntal

!'sychoJog;y, 1957,

3-10.

Rasmussen, Elizabeth A., & Archer, E. J.

Concept identification

as a function of language pretraining and task complexity.
Exp~rirnental ps~chol.2.f;x,

Journal of

Restle, F., & Emmerich, D.

1961, 61 1 437-441.

Hemory in concept attainment:

Effects of giving several problems concurrently.

1l (6), 794-799.

of Experimental PsY.chology, 1966,
Rokeach, M.

Generalized mental rigidity as a factor in

ethnocentrism.
191:-8,

Journal

!JJ.,

Journal of Abnormal and Social

~srchol_£gy,

259~278.

Rosenberg, S.

The influence of intentional learning on inci-

dental learning.

Journal of General

fpycholo~,

1962,

§.J_, 181.
Scandura, J.M., & Roughead,
in short-term memory.
Conventi.~

w.

G., Jr.

Conceptual organizers

Proceedings of the ?4th Annual

of the American Psycholo__gical Association, 1966,

33-J4.
Schneider, F.

w., & Kintz,

B. Lo

An analysis of the incidental-

intentional learning dichotomy.
Psy~l}_,ol~~z,

1967,

Jo~

E~iment~!_

.'Zl (1), 85-90.

Schroder, H. M,, Driver, M. J., & Streufert,
.:e.rocessinfi

of

~ysteJg;~

.:!..!!

s.

Information

_ind:tvidual~ ~tnd BLQ~)?.E..•

Holt: Rinehart find Winston, 1965.

New York:

71.
References - Cont.
Schroder, H. M., Driver, M. J., & Str~ufert, s.
formation J2.!.£9ess ing..

Human in-

New York: Holt, Rinehart and

Winston, 1967.
Schroder, H. M., & Harvey,
group structure.

In

o. J. Conceptual organization and
o. J. Harvey (Ed.), Motivation and

social interaction-co;:i:nitive determinants.

New York*

Ronald, 1963.
Schroder, H. M., & Streufert,

s.

The measurement of four

systems of personality structure varying in level of
abstractness: Sentence completion method.
Streufert,

Cited in

s., Suedfeld, P., and Driver, M. J.

Conceptual

structure, information search, and information utilization.
Journal of

Personal_~Y.

and e_q_ciB;.1 ,?s;y:cholog.x, 1965, 2,

736-740.
Sieber, J. E., & Lanzetta, J. T.

Conflict and conceptual

structure as determinants of decision-making behavior.
Journ.a~

of Pe:rs011ality, 1964, l?_, 622-641.

Silverman, R. E., & Blitz, B.
anxiety.

Learning and two kinds of

Journal of Abno.t_mal. and f)_o_cl_al

Psycholo~,

1956,

.,g, 301-303.
Silverstein, A.

Long-term retention for intentlonally and

incidentally learned words.

Journal of

and yorbal Behavior, 196Li-, l

(3), 236-24-3.

Simon,

s.

H., & Jackson, B.

V~~rb'.ll k~~

Effect of a relevant versus

72.
References - Cont.
irrelevant observation stimulus on concept-identification
learning.

Journal of Experimental Psychologr, 1968, 1.§.,

125-128.
Sommers, R. H.

"Limited capacity" hypothesis in incidental and

intentional learning.

Psycholo~ical

Reports, 1967, 21 (2),

545-548.
Stager, P.

Conceptual level as a composition variable in

small-group decision making.

Journal of Personality

~

Social Psycholo_g,y_, 1967, 2• 155-161.
Stager, P., & Kennedy, J. L.

Decision making and performance in

heterogeneous and homogeneous groups.

Technical Report

No. 6, 1965, Princeton University, Contract Nonr 1858-(42),
Office of Naval Research.
Streufert,

s., & Driver,

M. J.

Conceptual structure, in-

formation load and perceptual complexity.
Science, 1965,
Streufert,

1• 249-250.

s., & Schroder, H. M.

Conceptual structure, environ-

mental complexity and task performance.
E_x.J?_er~mer:t~'.l

Streufert,

Psychonomic

Journal of

Research. in Personalit;y_, 1965, 1 (2), 132-137.

s., Suedfeld, P., & Driver, M. J.

Conceptual

structure, inforrt1ation search, and information utilization.
Journal pf PeLsonali.!l, an9:_ Social

Psych~y,

1965, 2,

736-740.
Suedfeld, P., & Hagen, R. L.

Mcosurement- of information

73.
References - Cont,
complexity: I.

Conceptual structure and information

pattern as factors in information processing.
~X.

and

So~

Suedfeld, P., & Streufcrt,

Journal of

PsycholoGX., 1966, 4 (2), 233-236.

s.

Information search as a function

of conceptual and environmental complexity.

Psychonomic

Science, 1966, 4, 351-352.
Tatz,

c.

J.

Symbolic activity in "learning without awareness''.

Trabasso, T. R.

Stimulus emphasis and all-or-none learning

in concept identification.

Journal of Experimental

1963, .....65 (4), 398-406 •
....

~.....,

Tresselt, M. E., & :Mayzner, M.
ing.

s.

A study of incidental learn-

Journal of Psycholoe;z, 1960, jO, 339-347.

Underwood, B. J., & Richardson, J.

Some verbal materials for

the study of concept formation.

1956, ,.2.J.,

Bulletin,

SL~-95.

Underwood, B. J., & Schulz, R.
learning.

Psych'21..ogicaJ~

w.

Meaningfulness and verb'.3.l

Chicago: Lippincott, 1960.

Walker, c. M., & Bourne, L. E., Jr. The identification of
'
concepts as a function of amounts of relevant and

Wallach, f.1. A. ,
chi~.

&

Kogan, N.

Modes.

£f !.b.!PlsLl!n

ln y_QEng

New York; Holt, R:lnehD.rt and Winston, 1965.

74.
References - Cont.
White, B., & Harvey,

o.

J.

Effects of personality and own

stand on judgment and production of statements about a
centraj_ issue.

Journal of

Ex~;ri~ental

and Soci21.l

Psychology, 1965, 1, 334-347.
Winnick, Wilma, A., & Wasserman, W. L.

The effect upon in-

cidental learning of varying the information about the
irrelevant material.

American Journal of PSi[Ch_9logz,

1959. zg_, 439-442.
Wolfgang 9 A.

Effects of social cues and task complexity in

concept identification.

1967,

~

Journal of Educational Psycho1.ogy,

(1), 36-40.

Wray, Nancy P.

Effects of attention, incentive and sequential

repetition upon intentional and incidental learning in
seventh grade girls.

1244-1245c

Dissertation Abstracts, 1967, 28,

APPROVAJ. §HEET

The thesis submitted by David

I. Marx has been read and

approved by the director of the thesis • Furthermore, the final

copies have been examined by the director and the signature
which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary
changes have been incorporated, and that the thesis is now
given final approval with reference to content and form.
The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts •

Date

Signature of Adviser

